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RELEVANCE OF INDUSTRY CUSTOM IN STRICT PRODUCT
LIABILITY
In Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., I the Supreme Court of Washington
held that evidence of industry custom is inadmissible in a strict product
liability case. The Washington court held that the custom of the industry
is not always a relevant factor in determining the reasonable expectations
of the ordinary consumer.2 The court reasoned that admitting evidence of
industry or manufacturers' customs and practices would improperly shift
the inquiry from the reasonableness of the buyer's expectations to the rea-
sonableness of the seller's conduct. The court recognized that this shift in
focus would introduce concepts of fault that are relevant in a negligence,
but not in a strict liability, action.3
I. BACKGROUND
In product liability actions, Washington has adopted the theory of strict
liability in tort.4 Liability is imposed on a manufacturer when its product
is found to be not reasonably safe. This determination is made by inquir-
ing into the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer. 5 The trier
of fact is permitted to conclude that a product is not reasonably safe if it
would not meet the ordinary consumer's expectations of reasonable
safety. 6
1. 102 Wn. 2d 208, 683 P.2d 1097 (1984). This cause of action arose prior to the 1981 Tort
Reform Act, which makes evidence of industry custom admissible in design defect strict liability
cases. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.72.050 (1984).
2. Id. at 209, 683 P.2d at 1098.
3. But see Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEX. L. REv. 777 (1983).
4. Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wn. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969). For a general discussion of
strict product liability, see R. EPSTEIN. MODERN PRODUCts LIABILITY LAW (1980); L. FRUMER & M.
FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1960); R. HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILrrY (Cum.
Supp. V-A 1973); W. KEETON. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, ch. 17 (5th ed. 1984); Calabresi &
Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); Keeton, Product
Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966); Rheingold, Products Liability-The
Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18 RUTGERS L. REv. 947 (1964); Wade, On the Nature of
Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825 (1973); Wade, Strict Liability of Manufacturers,
19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965). For a discussion of the origins of strict liability and its relationship to the
present day economy, see Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Fault in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L.
REV. 225 (1971).
5. Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Wn. 2d 208, 683 P.2d 1097 (1984); Ulmer v. Ford Motor
Co., 75 Wn. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969). See also Eickelberg v. Deere & Co., 276 N.W.2d 442
(Iowa 1979); Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1976) (reasonable expectations
of the ordinary consumer); Roach v. Kononen, 264 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974); Cantu v. John
Deere Co., 24 Wn. App. 701, 603 P.2d 839 (1979). But see Keeton, supra note 4, at 37 (the test is
"nebulous, vague and ... imprecise ... because the ordinary consumer cannot be said to have
expectations as to safety regarding many features of the complexly made products").
6. Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wn. 2d 522, 530-32,452 P.2d 729, 733-34 (1969).
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The Washington court has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 402A doctrine of strict liability as a basis for a manufacturer's
liability, 7 and has applied section 402A to cases where the plaintiff al-
leged defective design. 8 Under this theory, a plaintiff must show only that
a product is not reasonably safe and that the product caused injury or
damage. 9 Proof of lack of due care on the part of the defendant is not an
element of strict liability. 10
The degree of safety that a consumer may reasonably expect is a rela-
tive, not an absolute concept."' Therefore, the Washington court has
stated that many factors bear on the reasonable expectations of the ordi-
nary consumer. 12 Such factors include "[t]he relative cost of the product.
the gravity of the potential harm from the claimed defect and the cost and
feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk." 13 In some cases "the
7. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (comment) (1965) (states that a manufacturer
of a defective product is liable for harm to the consumer even if the manufacturer has "exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of the product").
8. See Connor v. Skagit Corp.. 99 Wn. 2d 709. 664 P.2d 1208 (1983): Seattle-First Nat'l Bank
v. Tabert, 86 Wn. 2d 145, 154. 542 P.2d 774, 776 (1975). There are three general categories of strict
liability claims: manufacturing defects: design defects: and failure to warn. A manufacturing defect
exists when a product deviates from the manufacturer's own standards, while a design defect exists
when the whole product line is defective. Design defects, such as the one alleged by the Lenhardt
plaintiff, occur as the result of a conscious design choice by the manufacturer. The product functions
exactly as intended by the manufacturer, but nevertheless may be "not reasonably safe" because it
does not meet the consumer's expectation of reasonable safety. Liability for failure to warn results
when the manufacturer does not wam of known or discoverable risks.
Some commentators have criticized the application of the strict liability standard in design detect
cases. They reason that the trier of fact cannot make the multiple, delicate, and marginal determina-
tions that would be required in an evaluation of a design defect. E.g.. R. EPSTEIN. supra note 4. at 84:
Henderson. Judicial Review of Manufacttrer's Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudica-
tion, 73 COLUtm L. REV 1531 (1973): Twersk, Weinstein. Donaher. & Piehler. The Use and Abuse
of Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes ofAge. 61 CORNELL L. REV 495
(1976). At least one court has criticized this argument on the grounds that, regardless of the difficul-
ties involved in the balancing process. consumers are entitled to compensation for injuries caused by
improper design. Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Co., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978).
Proponents of this type of decisionmaking maintain that the court is not entering the domain of the
design engineer because the court's emphasis is on safety. while the engineer focuses on many other
factors such as cost, feasibility, and marketability. See Bowman v. General Motors Corp.. 427 F.
Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (noting that a conscious design choice involves a trade-off among safey.
utility, and cost).
9. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert. 86 Wn. 2d 145. 148. 542 P.2d 774,775-76 (1975).
10. A manufacturer does not exercise due care if he has knowledge of the defective nature of the
product, yet sells it anyway. In strict liability, knowledge of the harmful condition (scienter) is im-
puted to the manufacturer. Wade. On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products. supra note 4. at
834; see, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485. 525 P.2d 1033 (1974). Fora criticism
of strict liability, see infra note 26.
11. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wn. 2d 145, 154. 542 P.2d 774,779 (1975).
12. Id.; see also Wash. Pattern Jury Instruction (civil) 110.01.
13. 86 Wn. 2d at 154,542 P.2d at 779.
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nature of the product or the nature of the claimed defect may make other
factors relevant to the issue." 14
II. THE LENHARDT DECISION
The plaintiff, Lenhardt, left the motor running in his Ford van and was
injured when he tried to stop the runaway van after it slipped from park
into reverse. Lenhardt sued the Ford Motor Company for defective design
in the transmission system. Ford attempted to introduce evidence of the
custom of the industry as to transmission design. The majority defined
industry custom as "a practice or custom regarding a particular design or
manufacturing technique used by most manufacturers in that industry." 15
The majority held that this type of evidence is not always relevant to the
reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer. 16
The majority concluded that a defendant should not be permitted to
introduce evidence of industry custom unless the plaintiff presents evi-
dence that puts the custom of the industry or the feasibility of the alterna-
tive design in issue. 17 Justices Dimmick and Dolliver dissented, stating
that the degree of safety that a consumer can expect is inherently a reason-
ableness determination, which requires the trier of fact to balance the ben-
efit of the defendant's actions against the foreseeable harm arising from
these actions. The dissenters concluded that industry custom is relevant to
the assessment of the relative harms and benefits of a product's design. 18
III. DISCUSSION
The central issue in this case involves the orientation of the trier of fact.
Under the Washington consumer expectation test, the question for the
jury in the Lenhardt case could be framed as "whether an ordinary con-
sumer would reasonably expect a running car to slip from park to re-
verse?" The majority reasoned that evidence of industry custom (which
might show that vans of other manufacturers also slip from park to re-
verse) would shift the jury's focus from the consumer's expectations to
the manufacturer's actions. 19 A focus on the reasonableness of the
14. Id.
15. Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Wn. 2d 208, 210, 683 P.2d 1097, 1099 (1984). The Wash-
ington court distinguished evidence of industry custom from state of the art evidence. It defined the
latter as "the technological feasibility of alternative safer design in existence at the time the product
was originally manufactured."
16. Id.at209,683P.2dat 1098.
17. Id. at 213, 683 P.2d at 1100.
18. Id. at 215, 683 P.2d at 1101 (Dimmick, J., dissenting).
19. 102Wn. 2d208, 212,683 P.2d 1097, 1100.
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manufacturer's actions is appropriate in a negligence action. but not a
strict liability action. 20 The court therefore concluded that admissible evi-
dence must be probative of the condition of the product, not the reason-
ableness of the manufacturer's conduct.21 The majority's position is con-
sistent with strict liability theory in Washington. 22
The dissent's position is that the difference in orientation (consumer's
expectation versus manufacturer's actions) is not significant enough to
warrant exclusion of the evidence 23 because in both negligence and strict
liability actions the jury considers the same factors in determining liabil-
ity.2 4 In both causes of action the jury balances the risk of the product
against its utility. Because evidence of industry custom is admissible in
negligence actions, 25 the dissent would allow the trial court to admit it in
strict liability cases.
The dissent is implicitly questioning the content and distinctivenesss of
strict liability theory in general by stating that because the degree of
safety expected by a consumer is inherently a reasonableness determina-
tion, it is comparable to negligence analysis. 26 One way of maintaining
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See generally Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert. 86 Wn. 2d 145. 542 P.2d 774 (1975): UI-
mer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wn. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969).
23. However, the dissent stated that conformity with industry custom should not be a conclusive
defense. Lenhardt. 102 Wn. 2d at 218, 683 P.2d at 1103: see also Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co..
256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1977) (conformity with industry-wide practices will not protect a manufac-
turer from liability). Instead, this type of conformity is treated as one factor in the balancing process.
Additionally, the dissent stated that the relevance of industry custom should not depend on the plain-
tiff's tactical decision to raise the feasibility of an alternative design.
24. Accord Raney v. Honeywell. Inc.. 540 F.2d 932. 935 (8th Cir. 1976) (strict liability "re-
quires a balancing of the probability and seriousness of harm against the cost of taking precautions.'"
The trier of fact may consider factors similar to those considered in Washington strict liability cases.):
Raleigh, The "State Of The Art" In Product Liability: A New Look At An Old "Defense." 4 OHIO
N.U.L. REv 249, 252 (1977) (regular industry practice should create a strong presumption of sound
design in design defect cases). But see J. BEASLEY. PRODucT LIABILITY & THE UNREASONABLY DAN-
GEROuS REQUIREMENT 393 (1981) (industry standards are "dictated by self-interest and reflect an
indisposition to spend sufficient resources to reduce hazards or to eliminate slothful quality control").
25. Hayson v. Coleman Lantern, 89 Wn. 2d 474, 487. 573 P.2d 785.792 (1978) (evidence of a
general industry standard or custom is relevant to show negligence. in this case defective labeling.
although evidence of the practices of a single other business or person is inadmissible): see generally
Meyers v. Meyers, 81 Wn. 2d 533, 503 P.2d 59 (1972) (practices of other notaries are probative of
whether the procedures used by the plaintiff are reasonable, but mere conformity with custom is not
necessarily to be equated with the exercise of reasonable care, because the custom of the industry
itself may not meet the "reasonable man" standard).
26. See also Garrison v. Rohm & Haas Co.. 492 F.2d 346. 351 (6th Cir. 1974) (quoting Jones v.
Hutchinson Mfg., 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1943)) (the distinction between the so-called strict liability
principle and negligence is of no practical significance so far as the standard of conduct required of
the defendant is concerned); Balido v. Improved Mach. Inc.. 29 Cal. App. 3d 633. 105 Cal. Rptr.
890 (1973) (holding that negligence and strict liability are essentially the same in design defect
cases); Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197. 200 (Ky. 1976) (a degree of kinship exists
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the subtle distinction between the reasonable consumer's expectations
and the reasonable manufacturer's actions is to disallow evidence of in-
dustry custom in strict liability cases. Evidence as to what other manufac-
turers are doing is not probative of the defectiveness of the product in
question in the sense that the ordinary consumer could expect a degree of
safety that no manufacturer has attained. 27 As long as the policy of Wash-
ington is to have a strict liability cause of action, this distinction should be
maintained.
The Washington court has not yet dealt with the admissibility of state
of the art evidence (technological and scientific feasibility) in strict prod-
uct liability actions. 28 This type of evidence should be admissible because
it is clearly relevant to the feasibility factor in the balancing test used to
determine reasonable consumer expectations. Defendant manufacturers
may wish to introduce evidence of industry custom to show the techno-
logical feasibility of a product, but this back door approach should not be
allowed. 29
As a practical matter, a plaintiff in a product liability action will often
introduce evidence on five different theories of liability: breach of express
warranty, breach of implied warranty, misrepresentation, negligence, and
strict liablity.30 The evidence of industry custom will be relevant and ad-
missible in the negligence action; hence, the trier of fact will be exposed.
to it. Despite this practical problem, there is a difference between state of
the art evidence and evidence of industry custom. This distinction should
between strict liability and negligence when "unreasonably dangerous" language is used); Jones v.
White Motor Corp., 61 Ohio App. 2d 162,401 N.E.2d 223 (1978); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co.,
269 Or. 581, 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (1974) ("whether the doctrine of negligence, ultrahazardousness,
or strict liability is being used to impose liability, the same process is going on in each instance");
Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REv. 325, 326 n.6 (1971)
("Also, there is virtually no difference between a traditional res ipsa loquitur negligence case and the
modem strict liability case where there is an obvious flaw in construction and the proof of defect is
circumstantial.").
27. Lenhardt, 102 Wn. 2d at 218, 638 P.2d at 1103 (Dimmick, J., dissenting).
28. See Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1973) (Strict
liability and negligence merge in design defect cases because the unreasonableness of the danger
must necessarily be derived from the state of the art at the time of the design. The court reasoned that
a danger is unreasonable when it is foreseeable. An unforeseeable danger would therefore not be
unreasonable, and would not be subject to action in strict liability theory.); Raleigh, supra note 24, at
252 (the manufacturer is not required to design the safest possible product and the law is topsy-turvy
when a manufacturer is unable to decide before a product is made whether it will meet the appropriate
standards).
29. Defendant could introduce evidence of technological feasibility by expert testimony instead
of by state of the art evidence.
30. H. McGOUGH, III WASHINGTON COMMERCIAL DESKBOOK. 31-32 (1982).
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be recognized and maintained in the strict liability context through the use
of a limiting instruction.
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